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American businesses lose millions of dollars every year
through computer crime perpetrated by company employees.
Most of these losses are the direct result of inadequate
corporate security programs. They could be eliminated
fairly easily if organizations would employ common sense and
relatively inexpensive remedial actions that range from the
mostly broad-based and non-technical efforts of top manage-
ment to the very specific and technical measures inherent to
lower management levels. This paper deals specifically with
the steps that should be taken at the top management level.
It proposes that tcp management must first develop a ieo-er
understanding of the nature of the criminal threat and
effect an ethical business environment that will
detect/deter/prevent abusive inclinations. Top management
must then ensure that a sound overall security program is in
place as a framework within which specialized security
controls can and must function. Finally, top management
must initiate specific security controls and ensure that
subordinate levels of managers follow suit.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Computer abuse" has been broadly defined as any
incident associated with computer technology in which a
victim suffered or could have suffered loss and a perpetra-
tor, by intention, made or could have made gain [Ref . 1] .
For purposes of this paper, it is more restrictively defined
as any activity in which a computer system is used by an
employee to commit fraud or theft or to deliberately misuse,
alter, destroy, compromise or sabotage any organizational
assets, including data and information. Nobody knows the
amount of computer abuse that is occurring in the United
States, because much (probably most) of it goes undetected,
and there is some evidence that less than 15 percent of that
which is detected is ever reported. [Ref. 2]
There is also fairly widespread disagreement among
computer security "experts" about the extent to which
computer abuse should be considered a problem in 1986. For
example, a survey of 130 prosecutor's offices in 38 states,
conducted by the National Center for Computer Crime Data,
revealed that, last year, criminal charges were filed in
just 75 cases of computer abuse reported in those jurisdic-
tions. In dollar terms, those incidents totalled only
$936,000 in system and data destruction. Another $551,660
were lost in program and data theft and $105,170 in cash
theft. [Ref. 3]
Other surveys, however, suggest that the instances of
actual computer abuse are not fairly represented by the
number of cases that are reported and prosecuted. One such
survey, conducted by the American Bar Association (ABA) for
the same time period (1985) found estimated "... losses of
$20 million to $45 million in the past year and said that
nearly half the government agencies and businesses queried
have suffered computer [abuse]." [Ref. 3] As can be seen,
the ABA loss estimates are significantly higher than those
suggested by the National Center for Computer Crime Data
even though both surveys included as computer abuse any
incident that involved computer technology and disregarded
the source (internal or external) of the abuse. Still, even
the ABA numbers pale in significance when considered in the
context of a trillion dollar annual economy.
Dr. Jay BloomBecker, the Director of the National
Computer Crime Data Center, agrees that the estimated dollar
losses are relatively insignificant when compared with the
annual national economy. Also, he agrees with the ABA that
most instances of computer abuse are not reported, but he
contends that the ABA statistics are probably too large.
The findings of his organization indicate that, today,
American companies have done a reasonably good job of
countering computer abuse by reducing both the number of
incidents and the size of individual losses. He says that
his organization refuses to get "caught up" in the numbers
game that is played by so many experts in the field. [Ref.
4]
The reason that Dr. BloomBecker is unwilling to play the
"numbers game" is that he feels the amount of money lost to
computer abuse may be relatively unimportant. It represents
only one aspect of the computer security problem. There are
other, non-quantifiable, aspects that may be of even greater
importance than just the dollar-size of the losses. In some
cases, the quality of the losses of computer crime may be of
paramount importance. For example, the potential loss to
hostile intelligence agencies or through industrial espio-
nage is incalculable in dollar terms.
In fact, the "quality" aspect of the computer losses
represents such a tremendous potential risk to American
information systems that it was recently addressed by the
Department of Defense:
On Nov 11, [1986], the Pentagon confirmed the worst
fears of the information industry: It served notice that
it intends to apply sweeping new controls over the
contents of computer data bases to stem the flow of scien-
tific, technical, and economic information to the Soviet
bloc. [Ref. 5]
In this instance, the Pentagon is not really concerned about
the dollar value of the information taken. It is, instead,
so concerned about the quality or sensitivity of the stolen
information that it has taken some rather drastic steps to
stop the flow. The Business Week article, of which the
above quote is a part, went on to say that "jaws were
hitting the floor all over the audience" as Diane Fontaine,
head of the Pentagon's information systems directorate,
startled a meeting of the Information Industry Association
with a pronouncement that the Reagan Administration is
studying ways to censor public data bases, even though the
information contained in them may be unclassified and
readily available elsewhere. [Ref. 5]
Computer data bases are the primary aim of the Adminis-
tration's security efforts because they are considered
".
. . gold mines for foreign agents." [Ref. 5] In the
intense international competition for advanced technology,
access to protected data files can often prove to be a dis-
tinct advantage to unscrupulous but sophisticated individ-
uals or organizations capable of exploiting the benefits of
information painstakingly accumulated by others. To the
dismay of the American Civil Liberties Union and many
business leaders, the former National Security Advisor, John
Poindexter, issued a memorandum on November 5, 198 6, giving
federal agencies unprecedented powers to suppress informa-
tion under a new sort of security classification, called
"sensitive." Under this "classification," federal officials
may refuse to divulge even unclassified material relating to
national defense or foreign policy. [Ref. 5] Also,
according to an Associated Press article, other more
restrictive controls are expected to be included in a
10
pending 1987 Presidential executive order that will tighten
information security still further by such measures as
requiring better and more frequent background investigations
and, possibly, stationing Defense Investigative Service
agents permanently inside large defense contractor plants.
[Ref. 6]
It is in this sense of the "quality" of computer abuse
that Dr. BloomBecker believes that the proper focus of
computer crime statistics should not be so much toward
showing that computer abuse is a BIG problem, but rather
that they be used as a tool to assist in eliminating the
potential for abuse. For example, the Computer Crime Data
Center has found that four of the top five abusers of
computer systems are individuals who are -''internal" to and
working for the victim organization (these include full-time
employees, part-time employees, consultants and
contractors). [Ref. 4] So, while many organizations are
currently focusing much of their attention and resources on
the oft-publicized "system hacker," or external intruder, it
appears that the major danger may be freely admitted into
the organization every day.
As suggested by the more restrictive definition of
computer abuse, this thesis deals with the threat of infor-
mation system abuse posed by organizational employees. The
author agrees with Donn Parker that "... computer abuse
and crime are [not] out of control or that they have reached
11
epidemic or calamitous proportions." [Ref. 2] Instead, it
is believed that significant potential for computer abuse
does exist in many individual organizations, mainly because
of neglect of necessary security counter-measures by those
organization's top management. This belief is supported by
Peggy Watt, a correspondent for Computerword , who writes
that only 43.3 percent of the organizations queried by the
American Society of Industrial Computer Security even had a
computer crime policy and still fewer (only 38.2 percent)
had a model computer security program. [Ref. 3]
This thesis posits that those organizations that are not
formally addressing computer security issues are leaving
themselves open for abuse. It suggests that every business
tha- employs computer assets needs a security program to
help protect themselves against abuse, and especially that
abuse generated by "insiders." Further, it suggests that
the best counter-measures—the most cost-effective—are the
practices and procedures already in place in most organiza-
tions. Proper employment of these basic managerial tools
will greatly reduce the potential for computer abuse.
As a way of addressing computer security issues in the
most straightforward and common sensibly correct manner
possible, Ron Weber suggests that organizational leaders
should view the computer security function as an "onion"
whose layers of skin constitute the various levels of
management and applications controls needed to adequately
12
protect the information system. In his book, EDP Auditing ,
he pictures the "onion" as shown below [Ref. 7]. Forces
that erode the inner core (data integrity, asset
safeguarding, system efficiency, and system effectiveness)
must first penetrate the outer control layers. Weber says
that to ". . . the extent that the outer layers of
control are intact, it is likely the inner layers of control
will be intact." [Ref. 7:p. 24]
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This thesis will discuss Weber's outer layer of
controls. More specifically, it will discuss the things
that top management must consider and do to ensure that
Weber's outer layer of security is intact so that it can be
assured that the inner layers will be intact as well. The
focus will be toward top managerial actions needed to secure
the organizational computer assets against internal abuse.
Thus, in the chapters that follow, a process is des-
cribed that will ensure the existence of a solid foundation
on which a viable computer security effort may be built.
The process first defines the possible sources of internally
generated abuse and provides a profile of the "enemy"
against whom the program must be targeted (Chapter II) .
Then, in Chapter III, the necessity of an ethical business
environment in EDP organizations is discussed. Afterwards,
a description of the makeup of an overall security program
that will serve as a framework within which specialized
control measures can and must function is made (Chapter IV)
.
Finally, in Chapter V, specific top management-initiated
controls needed to extend the framework and to prevent,
detect, and deter internal computer abuse is detailed. It
is cogently argued that top management must get intimately
involved in each of these areas and lead the security effort




As stated in the previous section, the present focus is
on securing a sensitive computer system against internal
abuse. In order for top management to properly direct the
organization's security effort, it must first have a good
understanding of the nature of the internal threat. This is
particularly important in the computer systems arena
because, normally, the threat is not easily identifiable.
Generally, the computer abuser is a current and, probably, a
well-regarded employee. Many managers have been shocked to
discover that a highly trusted colleague, perhaps even their
Saturday morning golfing partner, "doubled" as their firm's
greatest criminal threat.
In this section, a profile of the "enemy" is established
in order that top management will know against whom the
security effort must be targeted. The discussion first
looks at the types of computer criminals that have been
identified and shows that each of these types represent
significant internal threats to the computer system. It
then concentrates on the most likely threat to most
organizations, the amateur computer criminal, and provides a
general description of this type of computer criminal and a
discussion of why otherwise good employees might begin to
15
abuse the computer system. Finally, because the thrust of
the security effort described is against the amateur
computer criminal, other important characteristics of this
type criminal are discussed in some detail.
B. PROFILE OF THE ENEMY
1. Types of Computer Criminals
Donn B. Parker, probably the most widely published
authority on computer crime, writes that computer criminals
may be categorized into one of seven types. These include
extreme advocates, governments, system hackers, career
criminals, deranged individuals, criminal organizations, and
amateurs. Parker says that each type is mutually exclusive
in character but, by changing his/her character, an
individual may change from one type to another. [Ref. 2:p.
106]
Top management must be concerned with all these
categories of computer criminals and, depending upon the
purposes of the organization and the degree of sensitivity
of the information processed on its EDP systems, it must
take appropriate steps to combat the threats posed by them.
For example, agents of foreign governments do pose signifi-
cant internal risks to many computer organizations, as seen
by the fact that Soviet KGB "... scientific collection
orders have targeted dozens of American firms and over 60
universities" [Ref. 8] for high-technology information.
Also, several European terrorist organizations have
16
specifically marked computer organizations for elimination,
and there is considerable evidence that some of their most
successful attacks have been linked to internal operations.
[Ref. 9]
2 . The Amateur Computer Criminal
However, while each of these types of computer
criminals pose significant threats to information systems,
the one that is considered to be the most dangerous is the
amateur computer criminal. This belief is based on Parker's
1982 statement that most "... reported computer crime so
far has been performed by amateurs" [Ref. 2:p. 107] and on
his subjective opinion of the relative level of threat posed

























A quick glance at a listing of the occupations of
the perpetrators of all 293 cases of computer abuse reported



































































































TABLE 2 - (CONTINUED)
Non-EDP People Persons Cases
Head teller 1 1
Senior airline official 1 1
Senior analyst 1 1
Non-EDP employees undesignated 6 4
Undesignated 66
Source: [Ref. l:p. 53]
As can be seen, most computer abusers are otherwise ordinary
people in positions of trust. They may possess special
computer-related skills, knowledge, and resources or they
may not— it is significant to note that only 42.7 percent
(125/293 = .4266) of the total cases were perpetrared by EDP
employees. More often, the cases involved non-EDP employees
and, frequently, ~hesa individuals occupied high-level
management-type positions and colluded with EDP-skilled
persons [Ref. 2:p. 277], which accounts for the large number
of people involved in many of the cases.
The breakdown demonstrates fairly clearly that the
computer abuser who has been most identified and reported is
overwhelmingly an amateur criminal. Parker suggests that
about the only difference between those that are identified
and reported and those that are not is that the former made
mistakes in their crimes that led to their capture [Ref.
2:p. 277]. It is a fairly safe assumption that most
unreported, as well as reported, cases of computer abuse are
perpetrated by amateurs. Thus, the amateur is the primary
19
concern of this paper and his/her profile will be developed
more fully in the following paragraphs.
Amateurs differ from Parker's other types of
computer criminals in the following respects. They are not
abnormal psychologically. Since they normally have
authorized access to the system, they are not trespassers,
as are system hackers. They do not depend on crime for
their livelihood. They often do conspire in their crimes,
but normally noi to the degree that they could be classified
as organized or government-sponsored criminals. Amateurs
are generally not extreme advocates for any cause other than
resolving their own personal problems.
Their problems include money, family, drug or
alcohol addiction, gambling, or work-related difficulties
perhaps created by the stressful environment in which they
must function. They often consider their problems to be
unshareable and find that violating their trust or using
their special capabilities is a means of solving their
problems. Other individuals may have a need to obtain
personal goals not in consonance with the organization or to
satisfy egotistical drives by means of malicious acts.
Thus, amateurs may perform a wide variety of white-collar
crimes or violent crimes such as sabotage. They are not
necessarily extremely intelligent, but usually they are
expert in the functions of their acts. [Ref. 2:pp. 107-108]
20
C. OTHER IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AMATEUR COMPUTER
CRIMINAL
As mentioned, amateurs have traditionally posed the
greatest threat to an organization's computer assets. It is
the amateur computer criminal that is the primary "enemy"
against whom the security effort must be targeted. So, in
the discussion that follows, some additional characteristics
of the amateur computer criminal will be enumerated. Top
level managers must consider these characteristics when
formulating their security program and controls. The
characteristics are mostly borrowed from Parker's Crime By
Computer and are based on findings of the Stanford Research
Institute. They include the following areas.
1. Age
Perpetrators are young, eighteen to thirty years
old, except those in management positions who tend to be
somewhat older. This is not surprising, considering that
the age of all computer personnel is lower than in most
other occupations. However, while not surprising, the
youthfulness of the criminal relative to the high degree of
trust inherent to EDP positions has often been a significant
factor in computer abuse cases. The desperation frequently
associated with the very stressful EDP environment combined
with the courage, recklessness, and self-confidence of youth
appears to be a risky mix. Also, behavioral scientists
suggest that the younger the person, the greater his cyni-
cism about managers and jobs; excessive cynicism encourages
21
unethical behavior on the grounds that "I'd be a fool not to




Women generally have not been as susceptible to
computer crime as men. When they are involved, they tend to
be keypunch operators or clerks and are working in concert
with others.
3 Rationalization of Misconduct
"Discovered" perpetrators often put more energy into
rationalizing their criminality than they did into perform-
ing it. They work very hard to reduce the element of
criminality in their motives. They can argue convincingly
that their misconduct: was reasonable under the circum-
stances. Their actions were designed to cause the least
harm to the least number of people and, yet, still success-
fully solve their problems.
4 Unintentional Criminality
Amateur computer criminals generally feel very bad
about violating the trust inherent in their positions, and
they almost always intend to restore or make up for the loss
suffered by the victim. However, they often find that com-
mitting the crime was easier than restoring the status guo
in an undiscovered way. Many computer embezzlers conceived
of themselves as borrowers (vice thieves) since they fully
intended to return the money. Those that "borrowed" money
over a period of time, later discovered that there was no
22
way to return it and, thus, in their minds, became criminals
without intending to do so.
5. Personal Characteristics
Perpetrators are usually bright, eager, highly
motivated, courageous, adventuresome, and qualified people
willing to accept a technical challenge. They have exactly
the qualities that make them desirable computer systems
employees. Thus, designing safeguards under the assumption
that potential perpetrators will not be aware of the techni-
cal intricacies is a futile exercise. The principal threat
against which protection is required is the perpetrator who




Amateur computer criminals t,and to differentiate
between doing harm to individual people, which they feel is
immoral, and doing harm to organizations, which they
believe, in some circumstances, is not immoral. Often they
claim that they are just getting even for the wrongs that
the organization has done to themselves or to society.
7 Feelings Toward Employer
Some form of disgruntlement with their employers is
almost always present among amateur computer criminals.
They generally identify with their technology to a greater
degree than with their employer or the business activity.
Thus, high stress and discontent are quite common as EDP
professionals try to do their jobs, stay abreast of a
23
rapidly changing technology, change practices and procedures
to incorporate advancements, and deal with managers who are





Perpetrators most strongly fear unanticipated
detection and exposure. They are generally white-collar
types for whom the exposure would cause great embarrassment,
loss of face and prestige among their peers and families.
The importance of this characteristic is that detection, as
a means of protection, is at least as important as
prevention.
9 Programmers
Programmers appear to be somewhat susceptible to
becoming abusive toward the computer system. As indicated
by Table 1, roughly 10% (29/293 = .099) of all cases
reported up to 1975 were perpetrated by programmers. This
is caused by several factors. Programming can be a most
overwhelming, intense, and challenging activity that can
obscure many other values. The development of software is
an exercise that is rife with opportunities for criminal
misconduct. Finally, some programmers get so immersed in
their work that they lose all contact with reality. They
are called computer "bums" and will sit riveted and
transfixed to a CRT for 20-30 hours at a time, barely eating
at all. They are compulsive and susceptible to misconduct.
24





Amateurs often collude with others in performing
their criminal acts. One study of 50 incidents, involving
losses in excess of $100,000 each, showed that collusion was
involved in 39 percent of the cases and 32 percent of the
losses [Ref. 12:p. 28]. This is because the computer crimes
with the greatest potential rewards often require more
skills, knowledge, and access than any one individual may
possess. Collusion tends to involve a technical person who
can perpetrate the act and another person who is in a posi-
tion to translate the act into some form of gain. The
differential association theory, which states that
perpetrators' acts tend to deviate only slightly from the
accepted and common practices of their associates, applies
strongly in explaining collusion. A group of people working
together will sometimes tend to reinforce one another in the
minor unethical acts that can grow to serious acts (e.g.,
they'll take home pencils today, paper pads tomorrow, and
pocket calculators the next day) . [Ref. l:pp. 41-51]
11. Ethical Breakdown
In Fighting Computer Crime , Parker describes another
characteristic of the amateur computer criminal that has
been repeatedly observed and that is noteworthy. This
characteristic manifests itself in the form of those
25
individuals who are known to possess high ethical standards
and yet who have learned to ignore them in a very technical
environment that treats employees equally regardless of
their ethical values and in which abusive acts can be easily
concealed. Such a situation describes exactly the environ-
ment surrounding a sensitive computer system and, not sur-
prisingly, Parker says the numbers of these individuals
"
. . . is growing as the percentage of assets and asset
records processed by computers increase." [Ref. 2:p. 15]
12 . Other Characteristics
Brian Starfire, a Washington, D.C., computer consul-
tant, recently confirmed in his nationally syndicated column
much of Parker's description of the computer criminal.
Quoting the ""First Annual Statistical Report." which is
based on the 7 5 reported and tried cases that were studied
by the National Center for Computer Crime Data, Starfire
also writes that most non-student criminals are 22 to 30
years old and occupy programming positions (just over 14% of
the survey sample) , followed by data entry clerks and bank
tellers. Further, theft of money was the most common type
of crime (45% of the total) , with theft of software or data
and willful damage to software (combined at 16%) being the
next largest areas abused by the amateur. The only other
significant single area of abuse was theft of services which




The amateur computer criminal is the primary "enemy"
that must be targeted by the computer security effort. The
amateur commits the majority of the abusive acts against
computer systems even though he/she is not expert in
criminal activity. Amateur computer criminals are particu-
larly difficult with which to deal because they are not
readily identifiable and because they are, for the most
part, otherwise good citizens and employees. They are
generally insidious and possess most of the qualities and
attributes that are found in the organization's very finest
workers. Stemming their abusive behavior without employ ina
overly restrictive and counter-productive safeguards or an
environment of distrust is a formidable task. In the
sections that follow, the characteristics of amateur
computer criminals are considered as the overall security
effort is formulated.
27
III. ETHICAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Before top management can effectively introduce a
computer security program or any specific control measures
into the corporate workplace, it is first necessary that the
executives ensure that a healthy ethical business climate
predominates ail other facets of the work environment. This
is so because of the natural tendency to circumvent
controls, especially those that may be viewed as obstacles
to progress in other important areas. Since top raanaceinent
cannot be omnipresent to ansure that its prescribed security
measures ara being employed, it must rely upon the goodness
and professionalism of subordinate personnel in this regard.
Thus a strongly internalized sense of ethical conduct,
ubiquitous at all levels of the organizations is of
paramount importance if information systems are to be
secure.
In this section, the concept of ethical business
behavior is explored in some detail. First, the requirement
for sound business ethics in a computer organization is dis-
cussed. Then, four rationalizations, whose widespread
acceptance in organizations cause unethical behavior, are
presented. Finally, the significance of these
28
rationalizations, especially for top management of an
organization that employs computer systems, is considered.
B. REQUIREMENT FOR ETHICAL BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
The requirement for a strong, ethical environment in any
business seems obvious. It appears especially obvious when
one considers the security needs of a computer organization
because ethical conduct serves as the foundation on which
the overall security program must be built. It is not only
at the core of individual control mechanisms, in essence
making them viable safeguards, but it properly recognizes
the fact that most employees want to (and, under normal
circumstances , will) act ethically. Thus, an ethical
business environment: is most facilitative of relatively
unencumbered productive effort and would have to be con-
sidered as the most cost-efficient security control
mechanism.
The fact that ethics is discussed here separately, and
not later with the other control mechanisms, only attests to
its overwhelming importance to a computer organization. By
fostering a strong sense of ethical propriety, management
can be quite effective in stymieing abusive inclinations.
Also, by establishing and relying upon a code of ethics,
management is allowed to take a precautionary posture that
minimizes the opportunities or perceived need for abuse on
the one hand while motivating honest activities on the other
(see the discussion on "Standards of Conduct" in Chapter V
29
for precautions) . To function differently would be unwise
because, as Leonard Krauss and Aileen MacGahan write, "...
it makes little sense, and is quite counterproductive, for
management to harbor a distrustful attitude." [Ref. 12]
C. FOUR RATIONALIZATIONS THAT CAUSE UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR
In view of the above, one would think that ethical
business conduct would be strongly internalized into the
cultures of most business organizations. However, this
apparently is not the case. As Dr. Saul Gellerman, Dean of
the University of Dallas Graduate School of Management:,
wrote in the harvard Business Review , roughly two-thirds of
America's 500 largest corporations have been involved, in
the last ten years, in seme form of criminal behavior 'Ref.
13] Also, consider the recent disclosures of insider
trading on Wall Street. Financial malfeasance at the very
heart of corporate America appears to be no insignificant
threat.
Dr. Gellerman postulates that this dangerous situation
is the result of the pervasiveness within organizations of
four "rationalizations" that can cause managers to fall prey
to ill-advised, criminal conduct:
A belief that the activity is within reasonable ethical
and legal limits—that is, that it is not "really" illegal
or immoral.
A belief that the activity is in the individual's or the
corporation's best interests—that the individual would
somehow be expected to undertake the activity.
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A belief that the activity is "safe" because it will never
be found out or publicized; the classic crime-and-punish-
ment issue of discovery.
A belief that because the activity helps the company the
company will condone it and even protect the person who
engages in it. [Ref. 13 :p. 88]
Since at least one of these rationalizations is, to some
extent, virtually always used as justification by managers
when they engage in illegitimate activities, they pose
significant threats to the high ethical standards and,
hence, the internal security posture, of any organization
and especially to those that electronically store and
process sensitive information (recail that one of tne char-
acteristics of che amateur computer criminal is his/her
strong tendency co rationalize tne misconduct). So, in tne
paragraphs that follow, these rationalizations ar= lescribea
and discussed more fully, and then their significance for
EDP organizations will be explained.
The first rationalization, that an action is not
"really" immoral or illegal, is a very old issue. How far
is too far? Exactly where is the line between smart and too
smart; between sharp and shady; and between profit maximiza-
tion and illegal conduct? The issue is complex and involves
significant interplay between top management's goals and
middle managers' efforts to interpret those goals. [Ref.
13:p. 87]
Top executives rarely overtly ask a subordinate to
commit an act that both know is against the law or is
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imprudent. However, their actions sometimes speak loudly
enough. They can leave things unsaid or give the impression
that there are things they do not want to know about. They
can seem, deliberately or otherwise, to distance themselves
from their subordinates' tactical decisions, so they will
not be involved if things go awry. They can promise rich
rewards for achieving lofty goals and imply that the means
to achievement of these goals will not be toe closely
scrutinized. [Ref. 13:p. 88]
The second reason that managers take unhealthy risks,
believing that the unethical conduct is in the individual's
or che corporation's best interests, nearly always results
from a parochial view of the interests involved. Ambitious
managers search for ways to make themselves and their
organizations look good. They attempt to distinguish them-
selves by outperforming their peers. Many, in their selfish
efforts to succeed, will sacrifice potentially outstanding
long-term gain for potentially smaller, but more immediately
recognized, short-term rewards. The sad truth is that many
managers have been promoted because of "great 11 results
obtained in these ways, leaving unfortunate successors to
inherit the inevitable whirlwind. [Ref. 13 :p. 88]
Believing that one can get away with abusive (even
criminal) behavior, the third rationalization for taking
risks, is perhaps the most difficult with which to deal,
because it is so often true. A great amount of misconduct
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escapes detection. [Ref. 10:p. 89] This rationalization is
particularly relevant to a computer system's environment
because of the fleeting nature of the evidence of abusive
acts and the fact that, relatively speaking, ignorance of
computer technology reigns supreme among the general
populace which often can be easily duped (including honest
managers and officials attempting to investigate the abuse)
.
Also very relevant to a computer system's environment is
the final rationalization that allows/encourages managers to
commit criminal acts, the belief that the company will
condone actions taken in its interests and will even protect
the responsible managers- The primary question here is,
"How does top management foster a healthy sense of company
loyalty without: allowing it tc go berserk?" [Ref. 13 :p. 30"
The issues behind this question are many and appear to apply
especially to computer organizations. As Starfire wrote,
many (perhaps most) computer crimes go unreported, even
after they are discovered. Also, since only 20 percent of
the relatively few people that are tried and convicted ever
serve any prison time, it " . . . is one of the safest crimes
anyone could commit." [Ref. 11]
These four rationalizations were posited by Gellerman
after an in-depth review of three incidents in which
unethical behavior by top management proved calamitous (and,
in two of the cases, nearly fatal) for three of America's
financial and industrial giants. The three companies
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involved were Manville Corporation, Continental Illinois
Bank, and E.F. Hutton. Although the details of the three
cases differ greatly, there are some similarities in them
that are worthy of consideration.
First, the executives whose unethical conduct cost their
organizations so dearly, were not extraordinary people. As
Gellerman said, the "... people involved were probably
ordinary men and women for the most part, not very different
from you and me." [Ref. 13 :p. 86] They found themselves in
a dilemma, and they solved it in a way that seemed the least
troublesome and most advantageous for their respective com-
panies (one might call them high-level amateur criminals!).
The cases also illustrate the fine line that exists
between acceptable and unacceptable managerial behavior:
managers are expected to pursue their companies ' best
interests but not overstep the bounds that outsiders will
tolerate [Ref. 13 :p. 86]. When the "heat is on," managers
may neglect standard controls and, if pushed by very lofty
goals, may not see clearly their real interests. Instead,
they may focus on the ends, overlook the ethical questions
associated with their choice of means, and ultimately hurt
themselves and their organizations. [Ref. 13 :p. 87]
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RATIONALIZATIONS FOR EDP ORGANIZATIONS
The significance of Gellerman' s findings for the top
management of an organization employing computerized infor-
mation systems is enormous. Consider the likely outcome of
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a situation in which widespread rationalization is allowed
to persist in a business alongside other predispositions
toward abuse. For instance, it has been discovered that the
motives most frequently driving employees to criminally
abuse their computers are:
1. Avarice.
2. Desire for the "good life" and material possessions.
3. Financial problems (arising from pressures to spend
beyond one's means, irug abuse, illnesses, college
costs, gambling debts, and much more)
.
4. Ego gratification fthe challenge of it).
5. Charitable (taKe from the rich and give to the needy)
6. Revenge (due to a perceived grievance against the
employer:
. ;"Ref. 12 :p. 36]
If these motives are strongly felt and if Gellerman's
rationalization process has been widely assimilated into the
norms of the organization, otherwise honest employees will
very likely abuse the computer system and will have very
little difficulty justifying their actions in their own
minds. This explains the increased frequency with which
Parker has observed the amateur computer criminal who has
high ethical standards and, yet, begins to act dishonestly
because others' unethical acts are seen as being rewarded,
while ethical behavior is not only overlooked but, in fact,
sometimes hampers progress in a sterile, technical
environment.
Another significant aspect of the rationalizations for
top management is that the rationalizations suggest that the
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mores of the company must be set by top management. This
means that top managers must first ensure that their own
behavior is beyond reproach and then mandate a company-wide
ethics policy that is intertwined with corporate culture
[Ref. 14]. It is not enough for them to simply dictate the
policies; they must also practice them in their daily work
routines. As has been written:
Every young manager will experience the pressure of
others' behavior as determinant of his own. [Most].
maintain that their superior's behavior is the major
reason -hey behave unethically. It is the top -hat sens
the ethical tone in most organizations and rhis is one of
the graves- 30 Ligations of high-level executives. Their
behavior will be emulated and converted into institution-
alized custom oy _ower managers. 'Ref. LO:p. 105]
In a. scmpu-ar organization there is also much risk that
unethical behavior by .nanagers will oe amulared and institu-
tionalized oy nonmanagerial personnel. This is another
significant aspect of the four rationalizations that must be
considered by top management. While the discussion so far
has dealt entirely with managerial ethical issues, it is
important to note that practically everything mentioned
applies equally well at all levels of many organizations and
especially to those that electronically manipulate data.
In fact, the great extent to which illegal conduct has
been found to occur at all levels of a computer organization
prompted Robert Courtney, an experienced computer security
consultant, to dub the phenomenon as the "democratization of
white-collar crime." He says that white-collar crime used
to be the domain of managers and other traditional
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occupations of high trust. However, the use of computers
has resulted in new and larger numbers of occupations in
positions of trust and changed patterns of trust in old
occupations. [Ref. 2:p. 103] It is vitally important that
top management recognize this fact and take steps to ensure
that the expanded nonmanagerial segment of the computer
organization acts ethically, as well as the organization's
managerial personnel.
E . SUMMARY
Thus, top management must institute ethical business
pracuces an all levels of the organization. It necessarily
must begin the process by acting ethically itself 'lead the
effort from the front) and, then, it must ensure that subor-
dinate personnel understand the need for acting ethically
and that unethical behavior will not be tolerated. Top
management can greatly facilitate this effort by realizing
the dangers inherent to the existence of Gellerman's four
rationalizations and by proscribing their employment from
the organization. Once the appropriate ethical business
environment has been established, top management can then
turn its attention to setting up the overall security
program.
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IV. OVERALL SECURITY PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
After top management has ensured the existence of an
appropriate ethical business environment, it must then use
that environment as a foundation on which to establish an
overall security program. This is important because an
ethical business environment, alone, will not succeed and
because no amount of individual controls, discussed in the
next section, will be sufficient without an overall computer
security program within which the safeguards can function.
[Ref. 15] This chapter discusses some of the important
aspects of the overall security program. It describes some
of the important issues that must be considered by top
management in setting up an overall security program and
demonstrates the importance of top management ' s active
involvement in formulating and supporting the security
effort. It then discusses the elements that should be
included in any overall security program if it is to viably
serve as a framework within which specific control
mechanisms can function.
B. IMPORTANCE OF TOP MANAGERIAL INVOLVEMENT
Just as top management's active involvement in and
support of the appropriate ethical environment is of
paramount importance, the same can be said of the
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functioning of the overall security program. Indeed, the
two issues are so closely related and the management of
their processes so closely interconnected that it is diffi-
cult to separate them, even as topics of discussion. Surely
both are worthy of top managerial consideration.
In the case of organizations that employ computerized
information systems, top management's involvement in pre-
scribing and overseeing the security program is especially
important. This is nor only true because computerized
information is very vulnerable (e.g., it may oe easily
accessed, stolen, altered, or destroyed without anyone
Knowing for long periods of time; , out also because the
controls, tnemseives, are frequently unwieldy, burdensome
overheads that act antithetically to the very purposes of
the computer's original "being." Controls stifle creativity
and innovation; workers feel encumbered by them (a feeling,
often with much merit!); and they will be circumvented
unless they are carefully planned and implemented and are
seen as being fully supported by top-level management.
Also, since every business is different and has
different perceived needs, the specific makeup of the
overall security program may naturally be somewhat debatable
and will require active high-level participation to be
accepted as appropriate for the particular situation. It
would be most advantageous if some organization, such as the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) , could simply specify a
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functional security program for any and all companies. Such
a specification, however, is not possible because of the
many variables involved.
Consider, for example, that:
Each individual computer [organization] is a unique
case. The threats it faces are a function of its loca-
tion, its workforce, its parent organization, its work-
load, its equipment and software, and its physical
facilities. Furthermore, the threats faced by an
installation change over time due to changes in employee
morale, the workload, the competitive situation, the
financial health :f the parent organization, and even
changes in the environment and physical situation. For
instance, the fire hazard may change drastically when a
new tenant: moves into the floor overhead; competitors'
interest: in product: design information or salas figures
may suddenly flourish when the parent companv success-
fully Launches a new product:. Any event: which changes the
computer environment or the attitudes of people working in
that environment, can cause a change Ln the threat posture
and should prompt reanalysis to determine if additional
oounrarmeasurss are warranted. "Ref. 15"
Deriving an effective security program for such a diverse
and dynamic environment is difficult. It is often nearly
impossible without the active involvement of top executives.
This simple realization by top management is a most
important ingredient to any effective security program.
It is also important that top management realize that
its involvement can be dysfunctional, however, in some
cases. As top managers consider the requirements for a
computer security program, they will gather environmental
information in either a preceptive or receptive manner.
Those that "preceive" will judge the situation based on
their preconceived notions about computers and computer
security. Receptive individuals, on the other hand, are not
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unduly swayed by preconceptions and reach their conclusions
in a more objective manner. [Ref. 17]
High-level managerial recognition of this fact is an
extremely important issue to the management of computer
systems' security. The personal preferences of top
management will often dictate the final nature of the
overall security program. Depending upon how top management
views the importance of the information system within the
organization (as either a strategic or merely a supportive
activity) , it will take a more or less active role in manag-
ing and supporting the system. [Ref. 181 Today, because
many "nigh-level managers have reached their positions with
little exposure to computer systems in their early careers,
or perhaps because their exposure was to radically different
types of computer issues, they suffer an extremely acute
discomfort in addressing information systems' matters [Ref.
18:p. 36].
Such "discomfortable" individuals are likely to approach
a computer security program in a preceptive manner and,
figuratively, transfer their suffering to the security
effort. Under these circumstances, there is no way that a
viable security program can exist. This situation possibly
underlies a study finding of the Institute of Internal
Auditors that general (top) management support for audit and
control programs needs to be improved if the integrity of
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the computer-based information systems is to be ensured.
[Ref. 15:p. 11]
Ensuring the integrity of the information system comes
at great cost, and this represents another reason why top
management must be involved in the implementation of the
overall security program. Not only are security controls
often expensive to purchase and install, but they can be
even more costly in terms of their negative impact on
organizational productivity. Security generally means
controls and controls generally mean that laissez-faire will
be replaced with encumbrances on the production floor. Such
a situation can quickly become destructive as the best
interests of production personnel are placed directly at
odds with the security needs of the organization. Conflicts
ranging from a disregard of the controls (if allowed to
occur) to outright abuse of the system (if the controls are
strenuously enforced and are viewed as too debilitating) are
likely to arise, depending upon how the situation is
managed.
Top-level management is clearly needed under such
circumstances. Its task in this environment is to ensure
the appropriate structure and management processes are in
place to referee the balance between the information system
user and safeguards imposed by the computer security pro-
gram. A solid ethical business environment can greatly
facilitate the balancing act (by allowing looser controls
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and, hence, more unfettered work processes) , but dozens of
security controls will still be necessary. Deciding the
extent to which these controls can be allowed to interfere
with an organization's raison d'etre falls clearly within
the province of top management.
In making this decision, it is important for top
management to realize that the inherent risks of an
information system mean that it cannot be made 100 percent
risk-free and still remain functional. Management must
decide not only the character of the overall security
program and the types of controls employed, but it must also
decide tr,e level of risK that is acceotable and the amount
of time, energy, money, creativity, and/or innovation that
oan oe sxpanciea in attaining that level. \ tradeoff must be
made between the direct and indirect costs of the security
program and the probable loss that could be incurred if the
security effort were not made. [Ref. 19]
In light of the above, it is incumbent upon top manage-
ment to effect an overall security program that is appropri-
ate for its individual organization at that particular time.
It must provide leadership, resources, and support for the
effort. It must actively participate in the formulation of
the overall security program because it is that program that
will serve as the framework in which specific safeguards
will be implemented. A small investment of high-level time
and energy during the inception of the security program will
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later pay significant dividends in terms of enhanced
effectiveness of the security effort, minimized damage to
the efficiency (productivity) of the organization's mainstay
operations, less duplication and fewer requirements for
change, and better acceptance and support at all hierarchi-
cal levels.
C. NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE OVERALL SECURITY PROGRAM
The remaining important issue, with which top management
must deal, is the makeup of the overall security program.
As has previously been stated, it is impossible to specify
the exact composition or a security program that can ce
universally employee in any organization. However, there
are certain aiements 3f a security program bhat snouli ce
considered ana stated oy top managers of any organization as
they implement a security strategy. These include the
objectives of the program, issues that should be written
into the program's charter, comprehensive and wide-ranging
security guidance, and other key ingredients that will be
discussed below.
1 . Objectives
R.C. Summers, in "An Overview of Computer Security,"
says that a computer security program should "... include
concepts, techniques, and measures that are used to protect
computing systems and the information they maintain against
deliberate or accidental threats." [Ref. 20] He states
that the objectives of a good security program should be to:
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a. Protect The System
The security program must ensure the protection
of information against unauthorized modification, destruc-
tion, or disclosure. This is especially important when one
considers that the computer has become many organization's
main repository of records representing all types of infor-
mation ranging from personnel files to cash and inventory
records to trade secrets.
b. Maintain Integrity/Availability
The security program must ensure the maintenance
of the integrity and availability of the computing system
and its applications . This area includes the use of comput-
ers in such applications as manufacturing process control
and airline reservation systems in which the data mus~ be
protected and readily available for use.
c. Secure Computer Records
The program must ensure that computer records
are secured in compliance with the legally mandated require-
ments of the countries and states in which the system is
operated. Examples of such legal mandates include provi-
sions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the 1974
Privacy Act. [Ref. 20 :p. 3 09]
2 . Security Charter
In order for these objectives to be met, the comput-
er security program must be based on top management policy
and support that clearly define a security charter and its
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scope [Ref . 15] . While these are also situation-dependent
and cannot be described specifically, there are certain
items that should be included in the security charter of
most organizations. For example, the specific goals and
objectives of the security program should be included, along
with the degree to which top management intends to support
the program and the authority that is possessed by security
personnel. These things should be clearly specified in
writing because of the likelihood of conflict between
security implementors and system users. The written docu-
ment, can serve as a contract between top management and
security personnel and eliminate much misunderstanding,
frustration, and organizational infighting. Also, the mere
act of formalizing and reducing to writing the scope of the
security program, the bounds of the authority of security
personnel, and the degree of managerial support forces high-
level managers to address these important issues head-on and
in an open-eyed fashion.
3 . Security Guidance
Another issue that should be addressed in a similar
fashion is top management's security guidance to the organi-
zation. This guidance should be fairly specific in intent
but should be comprehensive and wide-ranging so as to cover
all areas that are deemed important by top management. For
example, the Department of the Army's guidance begins with a
general statement:
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Sensitive defense information processed by Army auto-
mated operations and associated telecommunication systems
must be safeguarded against unauthorized access, modifica-
tion, use, destruction, or denial of use. [Ref. 21]
The Army then proceeds to list 14 specific guidelines, along
with their associated subparagraphs. Many organizations
will not require the type of in-depth guidance from the top
that has been provided by the Department of the Army (DA)
,
but much of the Army's guidance is relevant to any organiza-
tion "That has 3. need to secure its computer assays.
A good :ase in point is DA ' s policy that resolution
".
. . of the complex prooiems inherent in automation
security requires an approacn which cuts across functional
i_nes . . . rand] the greacast iegree of coordination and
cooperation between all levels of management." ;?.ef. .21]
The "top orass 1 ' of tne Army has seen the need to concern
itself with such mundane matters, and its counterparts in
any organization employing computer systems should do like-
wise. Other DA-directed guidance that top management of
civilian businesses should include in their security pro-
grams includes the features listed in Table 3. These items
are briefly described in the following paragraphs.
a. Risk Management Programs
Top management should mandate the establishment
of a formal risk management program for each system handling
sensitive information. Security measures should be applied
in response to identified risks. [Ref. 21] Ron Weber says
that a formal risk management program should consist of the
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TABLE 3
ITEMS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE OVERALL SECURITY PROGRAM
Risk Management Programs
Control and Compliance Audits
Protection of Remote Devices
- Priority Employment of Countermeasures
Design Security Measures into New Systems
3aianca Security with Security Needs
Background Investigation
Performance Appraisals
following three major activities: risk identification, risk
measurement, and risk control. Ref. 7: p. 7 5" Each will :e
briefly discussed oeiow.
(1) Risk Identification . The first step in
risk management is to make an inventory of potential
disasters that face the organization. This inventory should
include consideration of natural disasters (e.g. , hurri-
canes) ; man-made disasters (e.g., accidents, riots,
sabotage); external threats and financial disasters (e.g.,
legal/social responsibilities, management changes, competi-
tion changes) ; instability and unreliability of man and
high-tech machinery; and, hostile action (e.g., espionage,
fraud, theft, mischief) . Each list of potential disasters
must be complete so that contingency plans will not be
inadvertently omitted.
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(2) Risk Measurement . Assessing the loss that
may occur from different disasters is difficult, but it must
be accomplished as a basis for establishing the amount of
money that should be spent on security. One way of
measuring risk is to estimate the possible losses that can
occur from a disaster, and the probability of the disaster,
itself, occurring. These estimates form the basis of calcu-
lating the expected loss from possible disasters facing the
organization. The expected loss in turn forms the basis for
deciding how much to spend on risk control.
(3) Risk Control . Risks can be controlled
through system design, installation of security measures,
and regular security audits. However, some residual risk
will always ^xis*. This type risk may be handled by the
individual organization's treating any losses as normal
operating expenses; by sharing the risk with other firms
through trade associations (e.g., members agree to provide
each other with backup facilities) ; or, the risk may be
transferred contractually through insurance (discussed
later). [Ref. 7:pp. 76-77]
b. Control and Compliance Audits
Reguiring strict control and compliance audits
of operations and software development and maintenance
activities should be a top management priority. [Ref. 21]
Weber suggests that, in control audits, both management and
application controls be reviewed. He says that management
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controls should be checked first because pervasive weaknes-
ses in these controls may cause the auditor to deem further
review to be unnecessary. When auditing controls, the
auditor should assume that necessary controls are in place
and functioning as alleged by the organization. He/she then
identifies causes of possible loss and evaluates the effec-
tiveness of the controls at prohibiting the expected loss or
at reducing the losses to acceptable levels.
The purpose of compliance auditing is to
determine whether or not the system of internal controls
operates as it is purported to operate. The auditor seeks
to determine whether cr not alleged controls in fact exist
and if they work reliably. In compliance auditing,
computer-assisted testing is especially valuable. [Ref.
7:pp. 30-31]
c. Protection of Remote Devices
Top management must recognize the peculiar
vulnerabilities inherent in remote terminal devices and
ensure that EDP management adequately protects these
systems. [Ref. 21] Remote devices may be teletypewriters,
keyboard/displays, minicomputers, microcomputers with
modems, remote job entry stations, and automated teller
machines. Because they are machines through which data are
entered and output received, and can be used to perpetrate
computer fraud, their security deserves special attention.
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Generally, security measures for these devices
should be the same as for the central computing facility.
Access to the terminals should be restricted when possible.
It is particularly important to restrict access to terminals
that are used to access or update sensitive data files, data
bases, and programs. It may be desirable to isolate such
terminals in locked rooms to which only authorized users
have keys. [Ref. 12:pp. 170-171]
d. Priority Employment: of Counter-measures
A Key top management responsibility is to ensure
tnat costly or eiaooraca security counrermeasures are
applied only after aammistrative
, personnel, pnysicai, and
communication security controls nave oeen snown to be
inadequate. [Ref. 211 Enherent in this element ara the
system efficiency and effectiveness issues discussed by
Weber. The counter-measures are considered to be effective
if they accomplish their objective of ensuring a reasonable
level of protection for the information system. They are
considered efficient if they consume the minimum resources
in achieving the expected level of effectiveness. [Ref.
7:p. 9]
As was suggested in the introduction to this
thesis, many experts believe that most computer security
needs can be met by common-sense measures, such as the
administrative and personnel procedures currently employed
in most organizations. It would be unwise to expend
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resources on more elaborate measures until the benefits of
the already-in-place controls have been maximized.
e. Design Security Measures into New Systems
Top management should mandate that protective
measures be made a part of the original design of all new
automated systems because of increased effectiveness and
decreased cost. [Ref. 22] This guideline pertains particu-
larly to rhe high-technology controls that: are implemented
at the lower levels of Weber's security onion. Specifical-
ly, it refers to security-related algorithms and auditing
processes that are incorporated directly into a software
system. It is important that these type controls be olannea
and incorporated at the earliest possible stages of develop-
ment oecause of the axoonentiai rate o: increase in the
costs of changing the software to add the features at a
later stage. For example, as taught in Naval Postgraduate
School software engineering classes, it is 100 times more
expensive to change a large software system after the system
is in operation than it is to simply incorporate the change
during the initial requirements specification stage. While
all security needs cannot be known in advance and, there-
fore, some counter-measures must be incorporated in later
stages of development or after the applications program is
in operation, it is very important that top management
ensure that security is a prime design consideration and
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that its needs, to the greatest extent possible, are
included in the design specifications.
f. Balance Security With Security Needs
Top managers must require that measures taken to
attain security objectives be commensurate with the impor-
tance of the operation to mission attainment, the sensitivi-
ty and criticality of the material being processed and the
relative risks of the system. This guideline also deals
with system efficiency and effectiveness issues and was
previously discussed in Section IV. B.
g. Background Investigations
The personnel department must oe required to
conduct bacxground investigations on all persons filling
positions designated as sensitive [Ref. 211. After an
applicant has successfully completed all the initial hiring
steps (e.g., employment application, job interview), the
information must be reviewed and verified for accuracy. The
purpose of the review and verification is twofold: to
determine the suitability of the individual for the job; and
to determine if there are any problems in the applicant's
background that may indicate potential risks.
The verification, or background investigation,
may be conducted by the company's own personnel or by an
outside agency. Regardless of who performs it, the cost of
verifying the information is dependent on the extent of the
investigation (which is driven by security needs) and on the
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time in which it must be completed. The goal of the back-
ground investigation is to prepare an impartial profile of
the applicant from which an objective evaluation regarding
the applicant's suitability can be made. The methods
employed in conducting the investigation include personal,
face-to-face contact, telephone interviews, and letters
requesting desired information. The most effective way is
face-to-face discussion; the least effective way is by
written correspondence. [Ref. 12 :p. 61]
In light of the recent spate of espionage inci-
dents involving high-level government officials (e.g., a
retired Naval intelligence officer, and agents of the FBI
and CIA)
,
all of whom presumably withstood extensive back-
ground investigations, it seems obvious that background
checks cannot be considered the sole panacea. They should
not be viewed as such, especially since good people can
always go bad. Rather, background investigations should be
viewed as an effective tool to "weed out" undesirable
employee candidates and make the hiring procedures as
effective as possible. This is not a terrible end, in and
of itself, since, as Dick Brandon has been quoted as saying,
better than 80 percent of the incidents of employee theft,
fraud, misuse of information, or sabotage could have been
prevented by more effective hiring procedures (based upon an





A final guideline that top management should
specify is the requirement that EDP management must include
in individual job descriptions the fact that maintenance or
enhancement of EDP security has high priority and will be
heavily weighed in performance appraisals. Stoner and
Wankel define performance appraisal as " . . . the continuous
process of feeding back to subordinates information about
how well they are doing their work for the organization."
[Ref. 17 :p. 342] They also make a distinction between
informal appraisals (i.e., "chose conducted spontaneously and
on a day-co-day basis) and systematic appraisals that are
more formal, occur semiannually or annually, and are
directly rsia-aa to ^eri* raises and promotions. [Ref.
17:p. 342]
In order for performance appraisals to be
effective at enhancing computer security, it is important
that both types of appraisals be employed and that they
include matters related to security. Spontaneous, day-to-
day recognition of security-conscious performance of duty,
coupled with appropriate pay raises based, in part, on
security-enhancing work practices, will demonstrate clearly
to all employees that the organization is paying more than
"lip-service" to security. The old adage, "The squeaky
wheel gets the grease," applies very well.
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4 . Other Key Elements
In addition to the objectives, security charter and
guidance set forth by top management, the National Bureau of
Standards says there are five other elements that should be
included in an overall security program if individual con-
trols are to be effectively implemented and used (see Table
4) . [Ref . 12]
.
TABLE 4
NATIONAL 3UREAU OF STANDARDS PRESCRIBED
ELEMENTS FOR A SECURITY PROGRAM
Jomputar Security Policy and Control




A brief discussion of these elements follows.
a. Computer Security Policy and Control
General management must ensure that the organi-
zation has a computer security policy coordination function.
This function may be the responsibility of one or more per-
sons who act as a focus for computer security policy and
coordination. The function should be separate from, but
closely coordinated with, EDP activities. Its primary
responsibility is to develop workable computer security
standards and to coordinate the acquisition or
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implementation of security controls. In addition, this
function works closely with auditing to verify compliance
with standards and adequacy of the controls in place. [Ref.
15]
The policy and control function is important not
only because computer security standards must be set commen-
surate with the needs of the organization (i.e., they must
adequately control without becoming dysfunctional) , but they
must also be maintained in a state that is ready and
prepared to meet the current threat. Managing this process
is a real challenge because of the "natural enemies" of any
program to prevent computer abuse. Krauss and MacGahan have
identified three such natural enemies as being:
(1) Inertia . This is a two-headed monster that
represents the organizational forces that make compliance
with newly implemented security measures difficult to
achieve and also those that create tendencies to affect
business or system changes without considering computer
security needs. [Ref. 12:p. 424]
(2) Changing Business Requirements . Business
requirements can change as a result of competitive
pressures, because new products and services are offered to
the public, or because new technologies provide more desir-
able computer processing alternatives. These changing
business requirements will be translated into changes in the
company's computer applications. Unless there is a function
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to supervise the changes and to ensure that computer
security considerations are integrated into the new system,
the company will be in trouble. [Ref. 12 :p. 425]
( 3 ) Chancres to Organizational Structure . Any
organization's structure can be expected to change over
time, e.g. , two departments may be combined under the
direction of one manager. Such changes can be extremely
hazardous unless security is a prime consideration at the
time the change is made. For example, combining two
departments may reduce the effect of dual controls over
assets and the amount of separation of duties present in
specific ]od applications. [1161". 12 :p. 425]
The computer security policy and control
function should oe designed tc be especially on guard
against these "natural enemies." Security policies and
controls should be carefully selected so that it is easier
for individuals to comply with them than it is to circumvent
the security effort. Also, the policies and controls must
be flexible and carefully managed to ensure that they remain
appropriate for the dynamic environment in which they must
function. Close coordination is a "must" under such circum-
stances, and therein lies the need of the security policy
and control element.
b. System Design Standards
As suggested by the DA-directed guidelines, top
management must ensure that internal controls and other
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security mechanisms are included among the system design
considerations. Standards or guidelines should be
established to ensure that they are included. [Ref. 15 :p.
10] This, in essence, means that standards should exist
requiring that,
. . .
the [EDP] auditor participates in the system
development process ... to ensure, for a specific
application system, that controls are built into the
system tc safeguard assets
, ensure data integrity , and
achieve sysiem effectiveness and efficiency. ["Ref. 7:p.
99]
The guidelines in the following table Taole 3", should ce
employed in the lesign of any ocmpurar system.
rABLE 5
SYSTEM 2ESIGN GUIDELINES
Require user department and internal audit department
approval of system development projects
Require user department and internal audit department
involvement in the system's specification and design
phase of the project
Require user department and internal audit department
approval od detailed user specifications
Require the preparation of detailed technical specifica-
tions and of a detailed plan for the development of the
system.
Source: [Ref. 12:p. 125]
A brief description of these guidelines follows.
(1) Require User Department and Internal Audit
Department Approval of System Development Projects . Before
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a system development project is undertaken, the project
should be reviewed, authorized, and approved in writing by
the appropriate user department and internal audit depart-
ment. These departments will have to be intimately involved
in the system development process. They must, therefore, be
aware of and approve all system development projects at
their inception. [Ref. 12 :p. 124]
(2
)
Require User Department and internal Audit
Department Involvement in the System Soecificacion ana
Design Phase jf the Project . The two departments should be
involved in this pnase of :ne project ~o ensure that cne
designed system complies with acceptable accounting
policies, accounting and applications controls, ana with
other recordkeeping procedures requirsa cy regulatory
agencies, such as the IRS. They should also ensure that the
system is designed with management's objectives and user's
needs in mind. [Ref. 12 :p. 127]
(3) Require User Department and Internal Audit
Department Approval of Detailed User Specification . System
analysts must, in the course of designing the new system,
prepare a detailed user specification manual fully describ-
ing the new system. This manual must be carefully reviewed
by the user and internal audit departments to ensure that
the specifications are accurate and complete and meet their
needs. After these departments are satisfied, they must
indicate their approval in writing. Then, and only then,
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can the system development process proceed. [Ref. 12 :p.
127]
(4) Require the Preparation of Detailed Techni-
cal Specifications and of a Detailed Plan for the Develop-
ment of the System . These documents will guide the
programming, file conversion, user training, and testing of
the system being developed. They will also be used to
guide, control, and check the programmers' work. [Ref.
12:p. 128j
c. Insurance
Top management; must ensure chat the insurance
program is maintained in an up-to-date manner. [Ref. 15 :p.
10 J It can accomplisn this by considering the types of
insurance necessary for covering EDP equipment and facili-
ties, EDP media, business interruptions, valuable papers and
records, accounts receivable, and malpractice, errors, and
omissions. [Ref. 16: pp. 86-87] It must then employ the
eight steps in Table 6 (next page) to determine the amounts
of insurance to purchase for each of these types (if any
—
many large corporations and most governments are self-
insuring) . On a periodic basis or when major changes or
purchases of equipment are made, the steps in Table 6 must




STEPS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE AMOUNTS
OF INSURANCE COVERAGES
1. Make a formal threat analysis.
2. Eliminate from further consideration those threats ade-




Prepare a worst-case disaster scenario covering the
remaining risks.
4. For each scenario, prepare a contingency plan which
would keep the facility in operation.
5. For each step in the contingency plan, make sure elapsed
time and dollar expense have been estimated.
S. Summarize the costs for ail contingency plans and pos~
the totals, as appropriate, to the types of insurance
mentioned above e.g., to equipment and facilities,
media, business interruptions, etc.).
7. Review the coverage and the exclusions prior to going
into final negotiations with r.ne insurance agent.
8. If the quoted premium seems excessive, arrange for an
on-site field inspection with technical representatives
of the insurance company to determine what can be done
to change the system, procedures, or facilities to
reduce the risk and bring the premium in line.
Source: [Ref. 16:p. 87]
d. Contracting Management
Top management must ensure that contracting per-
sonnel are well-trained in computer technology and terminol-
ogy. They must have a thorough understanding of security
safeguards, the need to have them designed into new systems,
and other particular security-related problems associated
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with software development and purchases of hardware,
supplies and services.
e. Control Implementation Strategy
An important issue for top management to
consider in developing a security program is the manner in
which the controls should be implemented. To ensure that
controls are not installed haphazardly, that they are not
overly restrictive, and that they are the most cost-effec-
tive for the risK at nana, a strategy for implementation of
controls should oe employed. [Ref. 15:pp. 9-11] Robert H.
Courtney, in a document prepared for the Federal. Information
Processing Stanaaras rask Group 15, detailed tne steps that
should oe included in sucn a strategy. These steps include:
Perform a. security risk analysis.
2. Consider all security measures (controls) available.
3. Select the control that minimizes the risk at minimum
cost.
4. Implement the control measure that is deemed most
feasible.
5. Evaluate its effectiveness and actual cost.
6. Restart the process. [Ref. 22]
It is important to mention that, generally, top
management will not be the actual implementor of this
strategy. Its task is to ensure that a strategy is derived
and employed. Security personnel, working with EDP manage-
ment, will follow the strategy in implementing most of the
computer security controls within the framework of the
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overall security program. A further discussion of this
process follows in the next section.
D. SUMMARY
It is extremely important that top management gets
directly involved in the formulation of the overall security
programs. This is true for several reasons. First, the
overall program serves as the framework in which the whole
security effort must function. Also security controls will
not oe popularly accepted without high-level support.
Finally, because they are expensive in iirecr. and indirect:
costs and mus-c je lailcred to each specific ^rqamzationai
setting, top nanagemem: will, of necessity, be required co
provide Input -ana resources. Regardless of the circum-
stances, tnere are certain elements that musn be made part
of all security programs. These include clearly stated
objectives and guidance, a carefully written security
charter, and several other key elements normally found in
good overall security programs.
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V. TOP MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
A. INTRODUCTION
After top management has ensured that an overall
security program has been implemented as a framework within
which specific security controls may function, it then must
take steps to ensure that appropriate control mechanisms are
selec-ced and employed. It does this by selecting and imple-
menting its own measures and by ensuring that lower level
managers fellow suit. The controls implemented within the
organization will, therefore, range from che relatively
oroad-oased ana non-technicai measures of top management to
the very specific and teennical controls initiated by the
managers of the lower-level control layers described by Ron
Weber's model.
This section covers the security controls needed to
protect an organization's computer assets. It describes how
the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of
Standards approached the task of identifying security
controls that are needed at each organizational level.
Then, it describes the specific controls that should be
initiated at the top management level. First, however, the
discussion briefly focuses on how security controls at
various organizational levels function interdependently to
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provide an adequate security "blanket" against computer
abuse.
B. INTERDEPENDENCE OF SECURITY CONTROLS
As mentioned, top management's controls are general,
broad-based, and non-technical. Their purpose is mostly to
tackle major problems that affect the whole organization and
to provide direction and guidance to managers at subordinate
levels. In this latter sense, top management controls are
nothing more than a very closely related extension of the
overall security program: they extend the framework within
which the subordinate level controls must, operate.
The part that top management's controls play in extend-
ing the security framework is crucial to the appropriate
functioning of tne security effort. They assist subordinate
managers in determining the appropriate security emphasis
and controls needed at their levels and ensure that all the
controls are coordinated and integrated in a manner that
will eliminate "holes" from the layers of Weber's security
"onion" (otherwise his "onion" would be more analogous to a
layered ball of swiss cheese!). By ensuring that each suc-
cessive layer of controls is properly interleaved, top
management can, in effect, form a relatively impervious,
protective seal around the organization's sensitive infor-
mation systems. Also, by carefully selecting their control
mechanisms, top managers can allow subordinates the greatest
possible latitude in selecting and installing their more
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specific controls and, thus, lessen the perceived impact of
all controls on subordinate operations. The key to success
seems to be in identifying the appropriate top managerial
controls and in implementing them in the least restrictive
manner possible consistent with the security needs of the
organization.
C. PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING THE APPROPRIATE CONTROLS
There has :een much research into which controls are
most effective at securing a computer system while leaving
it, operationally, the most unfettered. Much of the
researcn has oeen oonducted by two agencies of the iiaderal
government, one O.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and one
"J.S. National Bureau of Standards (NBS) . As seen below,
altnough the agencies rook quite different: approaches to
identify the needed controls, their findings were remarkably
similar.
The approach taken by DOJ was to exhaustively search
through dozens of organizations that employ computer systems
to identify the security control measures, based on common
usage and prudent management, that are so widely employed
that they could be considered absolutely essential to the
security of any computer system under normal circumstances.
The Department's idea is that, if such a set of controls
could be developed, it could serve as a baseline of control
measures which could assist all computer organizations in
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effecting and maintaining at least a minimally acceptable
information system's security posture. [Ref. 23]
The DOJ does not purport its baseline concept as an
alternative to quantitative and qualitative risk assessment
methods, but it does believe that there are many benefits of
a baseline of controls. For example, accepting industry
standard and time-tested controls would save organizations
much time, money, and effort that they would otherwise
expend on researching already resolved problems. Also,
management: could be relatively content knowing that the
firm's computer assets were safeguarded at least up to the
baseline level by generally used controls. "Ref. 22: pp. 2 6-
38]
However, as 30J attempted to identify baseline security
measures, it found that no such commonly employed set of
controls exists. Instead, the Department found dozens of
controls, each usually recommended by one or two users but:
. . . not necessarily supported by widespread use. The
Systems Auditability and Control Reports from the Insti-
tute of Internal Auditors identifies 300 controls and a
set of control objectives based on a survey of 1,500
computer-using enterprises. However, one conclusion of
these 1977 reports was a significant lack of common usage.
Only a few organizations were found to be using any
particular control. [Ref. 23 :p. 37]
Every computer organization has traditionally viewed its
situation as unique and has derived its security-related
controls completely independently of other organizations,
even those with similar functions. The result is that a
plethora of controls and security postures, of varying forms
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and degrees of effectiveness, exists throughout the
industry. Because of the dearth of industry-wide commonali-
ty, DOJ narrowed the scope of its search to only a few
organizations that dealt with highly sensitive personal data
and managed to identify 82 separate controls for different
organizational levels and functions, including eight
baseline controls that should be "management initiated."
The National Bureau of Standards ' approach to identify-
ing essential security controls was different, even though
its objectives and expected benefits were basically the
same. The MBS attempted to identify a set of security
controls by having independent: research organizations,
expert in computer crime, study actual criminal cases to
identify the control measures that would have been necessary
to prevent or detect the illegal activity. The NBS study
identified 88 total controls, with only three listed as
falling under the purview of "general management." [Ref.
15:pp. 11, 12, 20]
D. SPECIFIC TOP MANAGERIAL CONTROLS
In the subsections that follow, specific top management
controls needed to ensure the protection of sensitive com-
puter assets are discussed, starting with those of DOJ and
NBS. Then, other top managerial controls, as gleaned from
pertinent literature, are considered. In essence, this
section describes the DOJ and NBS skeletal frame-work of top
management-initiated controls. It then "fleshes out" that
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framework by providing additional controls needed to manage
the inherent dishonesty, negative motivational forces, and
available opportunities that might cause/allow an otherwise
good employee to become an amateur computer criminal. The
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1. Top Management Initiated Controls (DOJ)
The Department of Justice suggests the following
controls be initiated.
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a. Computer Security Officer
The first of DOJ's eight top management-
initiated controls is the "Computer Security Officer." It
is described in DOJ's pamphlet, Computer Security
Techniques , as follows:
An organization with sufficient computer security re-
sources should have an individual identified as a computer
security officer. In small organizations, the individual
appointed may share this responsibility with other duties.
In large organizations . one or more full-time employees
should be assigned computer security administration
responsibilities. The computer security officer should
ideally report to the protection or security department
covering the entire organization. This provides proper
scope of responsibility for information and its movement
throughout the organization. For practical purposes the
computer security officer often functions within the
computer department. Job descriptions are highly varia-
ble: examples may oe obtained from many organizations with
established computer security officers. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-9 1
The ^biective of this control is to prevent
inadequacy of system controls. Its main strength is that
the security officer provides a focus for the formal
development of a computer security program. Also, depending
upon his or her hierarchical placement within the
organization, top management's degree of support for the
security effort may be conveyed to the entire firm. Working
through the security officer, top management can ensure an
effective security program without having to "micro manage"
the effort. The two main weaknesses of the control are its
relatively high cost and the fact that line managers may
attempt to transfer their responsibility for security to the
computer security officer. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-9]
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A job description for the computer security
officer should include, but not be limited to, the following
duties:
(1) Represent the EDP Organization . The
security officer will function on behalf of the EDP manager
as the point of contact for all aspects of EDP security.
His or her position must be separated from the primary EDP
operations so that it can remain totally oojective.
(2) Suspend EDP Operations . The security
officer must cause total or partial suspension of operations
(depending on cne situation) upon detection of any activity
which will affect the security of the operations. The
suspension will remain in effect until removed by the ZDP
manager. The security officer mus- be riven written author-
ization to suspend access to any system subscriber.
(3) Provide Written Directives . The security
officer will prepare, distribute, and maintain plans,
instructions, guidance, and/or standard operating procedures
concerning the security of automated operations. He or she
must also conduct periodic surveys to determine compliance
with written standards.
(4) Conduct Risk Assessment . The security
officer must review threats and formally assess risks of
vulnerabilities so that effective countermeasures may be
employed.
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(5) Provide for Physical Security . The
security officer should periodically conduct physical
security surveys to ensure that computer assets are safe and
secure in their physical setting.
(6) Conduct Reviews and Evaluations . The
security officer should review and evaluate the security
impact of system changes, including interfaces with other
automated systems.
(7) Provide for Training . The security officer
should coordinate and monitor periodic security indoctrina-
tion and training sessions for all employees.
(8) Advise Higher-Level Managers . The security
officer snould stay aoreast of state-of-the-art security
practices and technology ^nd advise higher-level management
of cost-effective improvements in the security posture.
(9) Review Reports . The security officer
should conduct, from a security viewpoint, a daily review of
audit trail and system management or user access reports.
(10) Control System Access . The security
officer will issue and control physical access authorization
of personnel with a demonstrated reguirement to enter the
activity or site (including users, contractors, and mainte-
nance personnel) . This also includes the management and
issuance of system passwords.
(11) Retain Review Authority . The security
officer should retain the capability to audit or review
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every file within the system without obtaining prior
permission from the file owner. [Ref. 21:p. 4]
b. Computer Security Management Committee
The second DOJ control, "Computer Security
Management Committee," is described as follows:
A high-level management committee is organized to
develop security policy and oversee all security of infor-
mation handling activities. The committee is made up of
management representatives from each of the parts of the
organization concerned witn information processing. The
committee is responsible for coordinating computer
security, reviewing the state of security, ensuring the
visibility of management's support of computer security
througnout the organization, approving computer security
reviews, receiving and accepting computer security review
reports, and ensuring proper control interfaces among
organization functions. It snouid act in some respects
similar to a Soara of Director's Audit Committee. Comput-
er security reviews and recommendations for major controls
should oe made co, and approved by, this committee. The
committee ensures that privacy and security are part of
the overall information nandiing plan. The Steering Com-
mittee may oe part of a larger activity within an organi-
zation to carry out the function of information resource
management. For example, in one research and development
organization an oversight council made up of representa-
tives from organizations that send and receive data bases
from the R&D organization was established. They are
charged with oversight responsibilities for the conduct
and control of the R&D organization relative to the
exchange of data bases. Especially important are ques-
tions of individual privacy concerning the content of the
data bases. [Ref. 23:p. 4-9]
The objective of this support is also to prevent
loss of support for the security effort. In fact, the
steering committee's major strength is that it visibly shows
the dedication and support of top management for maintaining
an acceptable security posture. By mandating that
membership must cross all organizational lines, the security
activity will be more consistent across interfaces; better
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attention will be paid to all information-processing-
related functions; security can be considered within the
context of other issues confronting the organization; and,
policies and procedures can be more effectively enforced.
Also, a committee approach can avoid the control of security
by technologists who tend to be limited to technical solu-
tions that may be more stimulating to them but more
expensive and less effective to the organization. [Ref.
23: p. 4-3] Finally, this control can meet the requirements
of the computer security policy and control function of the
cveraii security program, discussed in the previous chapter,
c. Cooperation of Computer Security Officers
The third top management control of DOJ is
"Cooperation of Computer Security Dfficers." It is des-
cribed as follows:
Maintaining an effective computer security function
can be enhanced by exchange of information with computer
security functions in other outside organizations. Local
computer security organizations can be developed within a
city, a part of a city, or regionally. Monthly or other
periodic meetings of computer security officers can be
held to exchange useful information and experience. A
hotline communication capability can be established for
exchange of information on an emergency basis to provide
warning of possible mishaps or losses. It is important to
limit the details of information exchanged to ensure that
confidential controls information is not disseminated to
unauthorized parties. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-11]
This control is also an extension of the
computer security officer control and has the objective of
proactively strengthening the adequacy of system controls.
By exchanging information with computer security officers of
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other organizations, important knowledge and techniques may
be gained in the most time- and cost-efficient basis
possible. Also, security officers can strengthen their
sense of professionalism by relating directly with others in
their chosen career field. A weakness of this control is
the danger inherent in too much information regarding an
organization's security posture/problems becoming known to
unauthorized persons. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-111 However, that
danger must oe weighed against the positive aspects of
sharing information.
d. Keeping Security Reports Confidential
The Justice Department's fourth management-
initiated control, "Keeping Security Reports Confidential,"
is describee as:
Computer security requires the use and filing of
numerous reports, including results of security reviews,
audits, exception reports, documentation of loss inci-
dence, documentation of controls, control installation and
maintenance, and personnel information. These reports are
extremely sensitive and should be protected to the same
degree as the highest level of information classification
within the organization. A clean desk policy should be
maintained in the security and audit offices. All
security documents should be physically locked in sturdy
cabinets. Computer-readable files should be secured
separately from other physically stored files and should
have high-level access protection when stored in a
computer. [Ref. 23:p. 4-10]
Although keeping security information under a
high degree of protection makes the information difficult
and time-consuming to use, it is nonetheless important to
prevent taking, disclosure, or unauthorized use. It is also
important because the security function must set the example
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for the remainder of the organization by appropriately
caring for confidential information. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-10]
e. Data Classification
The fifth control, "Data Classification, " is
described as follows:
Data may be classified at different security levels to
produce cost savings and effectiveness of applying con-
trols consistent with various levels of sensitivity of
data. Some organizations maintain the same level of
security for all data, believing that making exceptions is
-co cosily. Other organizations may have only small
amounts of data of a highly sensitive nature and find that
applying special controls to the small amount of data is
cost-af fective. When data are classified, they may be
identified in two or more levels, often referred to as
general information, confidential information. secret
information and other nigher levels of classification
named accoraing ~o the functional use of the data, such as
trade secret lata, unreported financial performance, etc.
[Ref. 23:p. 4-6]
The objective of this control is, obviously, to
prevent compromise of sensitive data. By treating data
security requirements differently, according to the data's
sensitivity level, and allowing access only on a need-to-
know basis, an organization can most easily ensure that data
is provided adequate protection but also that needed data is
most readily accessible for legitimate purposes. Thus, this
control allows the most cost-efficient balance between
security and productivity requirements. A special consider-
ation should be the danger of over or under classifying data
and the fact that classification can easily result in exces-
sive data handling/processing complexity. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-6]
It is also important to point out that classification of
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data in a hierarchical scheme and access to it on a need-to-
know basis is extremely hard to implement in practice. The
only organization that has been able to do this is the
federal government, which achieves it only by a process of
segregated computer systems.
f. Financial Loss Contingency and Recovery Funding
The sixth control that should be implemented by
top management is "Financial Loss Contingency and Recovery
Funding" and is described by DOJ as follows:
Self-insured organizations, such as government agen-
cies, should be assured of readily available emergency
funds for contingencies and recovery. Specialized EDP
insurance is avaiiaoie and snouid oe considered when
insurance covering other types of losses in a business may
not apply. Financial risk protac~ion should cover asset
losses, business interruption, and extra expenses result-
ing -'rem contingency recovery. Organizations net self-
insured should bene all employees against fraud in high-
risk areas of daca processing activities. Blanket bonds
will normally cover this activity. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-5]
This top management control was also discussed
by the National Bureau of Standards, but as an element that
should be included in the overall security program. Regard-
less of its placement, the objective is to ensure that the
organization can recover from a business interruption. The
most cost-effective method of accomplishing this objective
(for non-self-insuring organizations) is by gaining protec-
tion and sharing economic risks with other companies, i.e.,
through purchased insurance programs. However, insurance
must not be allowed to become an alternative to good
security discipline. [Ref. 23 :p. 4-5]
78
g. Separation and Accountability of EDP
Functions/Duties
"Separation and Accountability of EDP
Functions/Duties," the seventh DOJ control, is described in
this manner:
Holding managers accountable for the security in the
areas they manage requires that these areas be clearly and
explicitly defied so that there is no overlap or gaps in
managerial control of EDP functions. EDP functions should
be broken down into as many discrete self-contained
activities as is practical and cost-effective under the
circumstances. Besides being a good general management
principle to maintain high performance, it also provides
the necessary explicit structure for assignment of con-
trols, responsibility for them, accountability and a means
of measuring the completeness and consistency Df meeting
ail vulnerabilities adequately. Separate, well-defined
EDP functions aiso facilitate the separation of duties
among managers, as is required in separation of duties of
employees. This reduces the level of trust needed for
eacn manager. The functions of authorization, custody of
assets, ana accountability should be separated to the
extant possible. [Ref. 23 :p. 4—1]
This control is designed to prevent loss of
support for the security effort and reduce the possibility
of accidental or intentional acts resulting in losses. It
forces the need for collusion among individuals who may
attempt unauthorized activities. It enhances efficiency in
EDP functions and inhibits the loss of control from
migrating from one function to another. However, increased
complexity of EDP functions could result from excessive
separation of functions, making the application of individ-
ual controls more difficult. Also, small shops may not have
adequate numbers of employees to support extensive separa-
tion of duties. [Ref. 23:p. 4-1]
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Krauss and MacGahan expound upon the importance
of this control, saying that it cannot be overemphasized.
They believe that no single individual should have responsi-
bility for the complete processing of any single or group of
transactions. Further, there should be no way that a person
could make an error or abusive act without being detected by
some other person during the routine execution of that other
person's responsibilities. Forcing dishonest employees to
collude serves as a deterrence and prevention measure and
increases the Likelihood of detection,, since the greater
number of people involved means that mistakes are more
prooable and the presence of a particular person needed to
perform a required manipulation is less likely as the
conspirators' numoers increase. [Ref- 12: pp. 80-81]
h. EDP Auditor
The eighth and final control measure that DOJ
suggests top management of any organization should employ as
a security measure to protect its computer assets is the
"EDP Auditor." Since the EDP auditing function is one of
the most important controls and because it is used as a
feedback mechanism to top management on the effectiveness of
the other measures, discussion of it will be held until all
other top management controls have been considered.
2 . Top Management Initiated Controls (NBS)
The discussion will now turn to the three control
measures that the National Bureau of Standards identified as
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worthy of top management initiation. These include the
following factors.
a. Adjustment/Correction Reporting
The first, "Adjustment/Correction Reporting," is
described by NBS as:
Policy, procedures, and software to provide reports of
adjustment/correction transactions covering the sphere of
influence for each manager. For example, any modifica-
tion, updates, deletions, or other changes to the payroll
master file should be reported regularly to the manager of
payroll systems for his information and action. [Ref.
15:p. 82]
This control is actually an extension of the
''Separation and Accountability of EDP Functions/Duties"
control described by DOJ. It is important because error
corrections and adjustment transactions are initiated in
reaction to existing problems and are often not subjected to
appropriate and adeguate control procedures. Such situa-
tions provide an opportunity for the dishonest employee to
perpetrate fraud by preparing and submitting improper or
fictitious transactions. If not controlled, such fraudulent
transactions may never be detected. [Ref. 12 :p. 106]
b. Job Rotation
The second of NBS ' s top management controls,
"Job Rotation," is described as:
Policy and procedures to periodically rotate those posi-
tions that have a great deal of authority among
individuals in the data handling process. For example,
the position responsible for address changes should be
assumed by new persons periodically and without notice.
The new person's first responsibility would be to verify
the integrity of the file. [Ref. 15:p. 82]
81
The reason that unannounced duty rotations
should be standard procedure is that the practice serves as
a deterrence to abuse and to collusion. If a person is
aware that he or she, without notice, is likely to be asked
to switch jobs, he or she will be less inclined to begin to
fraudulently manipulate the system, because the fruits of
the manipulation will often remain for long periods and be
discovered by the replacement. Also, other individuals will
be less likely to collude, because they know that job rota-
tions mean that still other people must be brought into the
scneme and, hence, the collusion becomes exoanded and more
risky. [Ref. 12 :p. 12 3 1 Anytime that an individual resists
rotating from a sensitive computer position, foul play
should oe suspected until tne person's reason for resistance
can be checked out.
c. Disaster Avoidance
The third of NBS s three management-initiated
security controls, "Disaster Avoidance," deals mostly with
ensuring that the physical plant is protected. It is des-
cribed as:
Policy that facilities, both central and remote, are to be
designed and constructed (or modified) so as to provide
maximum protection against natural disasters and against
persons intent on destroying physical or intellectual
property. [Ref. 15:p. 83]
Physical security measures are generally beyond
the scope of this paper. However, some aspects of this
control do pertain to protecting a computer system against
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internal abuse. These include designating certain areas,
such as the computer room, data library, and software
development areas, as "off limits" to unauthorized
personnel; eliminating non-essential doors and controlling
access to those considered essential; utilization of identi-
fication badges; and enforcing visitor controls. While much
of these measures clearly falls within the controlling
province of EDP management and below, general policies and
guidelines that classify and/or specify expectations of too
management are nor our of order.
3 . Other Too Management Initiated Controls
In addition re the eleven controls discussed above
rhere are others than are important for top management to
initiate in order ~o complete the computer security frame-
work. Several of these are discussed in the following
paragraphs. Because different organizations will reguire
the implementation of different top managerial controls and
because there are literally dozens of such controls from
which to choose, the following discussion does not attempt
to cover all the possibilities. Rather, it covers the
additional top management controls that appear most widely
addressed in the literature, that are appropriate to safe-
guard the assets of most computer organizations, and/or that
seem especially pertinent to a computer system's
environment. These controls include the following features.
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a. Guidelines for Ethical Decisionmaking
The first of these controls is called "Guide-
lines for Ethical Decisionmaking." This control is
necessary to counter the four rationalizations that may
persist in all organizations and cause employees to act
unethically. It must be designed to address the following
situation, as stated by Gellerman:
How can managers avoid crossing a line that is seldom
precise? Unfortunately, most know that they nave over-
stepped it only wnen they nave gone too far. They have no
reliable guidelines about what will be overlooked or
tolerated or wnat will be condemned or attacked. [Ref.
13:pp. 33-89]
The solution "o this situation _s for too
management to establish specific ana unquestionable guide-
lines for ethical behavior. The line between proper and
improper conduct must oe made exactingly precise oy stating
clearly the bounds within which decisions must be made.
When employees must operate in murky borderlands, top
management is obligated to force them to trust in and employ
the most reliable guideline of all: when in doubt, don't
—
especially until the legality of the situation can be
clarified. [Ref. 13:p. 89]
Also, senior executives are responsible to draw
the line between loyalty to the company and action against
the laws and values of society in which the company must
operate. Further, because the line may become obscured in
the "heat of the moment," it must be drawn well short of
where reasonable men and women could begin to suspect that
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their rights have been violated (and especially well short
of the point at which a prosecutor might consider an
indictment is warranted) . Finally, and most importantly,
top managers must stress that excuses of company loyalty
will not be accepted for criminal or unethical behavior.
They must make it clear that employees who harm other
people, even allegedly for the company's benefit, will be
fired. [Ref. 13:p. 90]
b. Standards of Conduct
The next top management control to be discussed
is "Standards of Conduct." Because this control mechanism
is very important to the security effort, it is considered
in some detail. In Chapter III, the discussion on ethics
mentioned that establishing a code of ethics can greatly
assist top executives in managing the security effort. It
can, too, and a strong ethical environment, as stated, is
absolutely essential if the computer assets are to be
secure. However, top managers would not only be naive but
also big losers if they believed that a code of ethics or
strong sense of ethics would be sufficient to protect their
computer system:
One of the most troubling aspects of the . . . case is
the company's admission that those involved were thorough-
ly familiar with the company's ethical standards before
the incident took place. This suggests that the practice
of declaring codes of ethics and teaching them to managers
is not enough to deter unethical conduct. Something
stronger is needed. [Ref. 13 :p. 90]
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That "something stronger" is a Standards of
Conduct, which is significantly different from a Code of
Ethics. The code deals more with normative issues. It
explains that which "should be" versus that which "is."
Ethical codes are based on trust and derive their strength
by appealing to one's sense of professionalism and moral
obligations to do that which is right.
Standards of Conduct, on the other hand, deal
more straightforwardly with the reality of the workplace.
As seen in the description of the "enemy," employees (even
normally honest ones) do sometimes face situations that may
cause them to look beyond enhical means for solutions.
Properly designed Standards of Conduct will not only speci-
fically prescribe cartain behaviors bur will also cause
tempted workers to think long and hard before committing
themselves to abusive acts, i.e., the standards serve as a
strong deterrent as well as a preventive control.
In order for Standards of Conduct to serve these
dual purposes, they must possess something that Codes of
Ethics normally lack: "teeth." This means that Standards
of Conduct must have built-in enforcement mechanisms. If an
employee violates a standard, he or she should be disci-
plined commensurate with the seriousness of the violation.
The measures taken may range from simple "wrist slapping" to
dismissal and should always include criminal prosecution if
warranted. Further, the discipline should be administered
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according to the "hot stove" rule, as described by Stephen
Robbins: it should be immediate, consistent, and
impersonal. [Ref. 24] Also, especially important for a
computer systems environment, news of the situation and the
disciplinary action taken should be widely disseminated as a
deterrence to others and to counter the notion, mentioned by
William Starfire, that computer crime is safe crime.
Inherent in the discussion of enforcement of
Standards of Conduct are two ether issues that are worthy of
note. First, the standards will only be as effective as
they are made to be. Often companies will specify
formalized, written standards, but then they do little to
review for compliance. However, unless the standards = re
closely monitored to ensure compliance, '".hey will be
useless. This policy compliance feedback mechanism must be
designed into the system and checked closely by internal and
external auditors.
Second, employees must be well versed in the
specific details of the standards. This is crucial if the
standards are to be enforceable. Many organizations require
that all newly assigned or newly hired personnel be trained
in the Standards of Conduct soon after arrival. Thereafter,
they must review the standards on a periodic basis (fre-
quently annually) . After training or reviewing, employees
are required to sign a statement acknowledging that they
understand and will comply with the provisions of the
87
standards. The signed acknowledgement has a strong
deterrence value and clearly eliminates ignorance as an
excuse for standards violations.
The "Standards of Conduct" control is actually
an "umbrella" control under which top management can specify
other more specialized or ad hoc controls that it sees are
needed to manage high-potential problem areas or situations
that may arise unexpectedly. There are many such controls
that are at management's disposal. Some of these apply
especially to a computer environment and should be included
by top management in any published Standards of Conduct Cor
an organization that employs electronic information systems.
These include tne following measures.
(1) Gratuitiss . The giving and receiving Df
gifts between customers and vendors, regardless of the
stated reasons, are bribery if either party or both parties
stand to benefit as a result of the "gift." Receiving or
giving gifts as part of business operating procedures must
be strictly prohibited. This control should also specifi-
cally address the receipt of gifts from business associates
by family members of company employees.
(2) Moonlighting . "Moonlighting on the job,"
or engaging in secondary income activity while employed in a
full-time position, costs American businesses a significant
and growing portion of the estimated $160 billion spent each
year on employees' deliberate waste of on-the-job time.
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There are four compelling reasons why moonlighting should be
curtailed from an EDP environment: it causes reduced per-
formance; encourages unauthorized use of resources; repre-
sents potential conflicts of interest; and affects employee
morale. [Ref. 26]
Even if circumstances do not allow moon-
lighting to be totally prohibited, it should be publicly
discouraged and strictly controlled. If the second job
appears to interfere with the employee's on-the-]ob perform-
ance, or if it is such that conflicts of interest are
likely, tnen permission to moonlight should be denied. It
is especially important in a computer systems environment
that workers who aeai with sensitive assets or functions not
be allowed to perform similar functions in ether organiza-
tions. This is because of the natural tendency to illegally
transfer proprietary information/assets away from the parent
organization (in effect, to pirate them for use on the
second job)
.
While moonlighting on the job is insidious
to an organization, moonlighting per se may not be. It is
thus important that every organization derive a moonlighting
policy and guidelines that are appropriate for its particu-
lar circumstances. According to Jeffrey Davidson, however,
all firms must include in their guidelines statements that:
1. Spell out the conditions under which top management
will approve, disapprove or be neutral toward
moonlighting (e.g., it may applaud teaching at local
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colleges or lending skills to government service but
"frown upon" working for a competitor)
.
2. Classify whether in-house telephones, secretaries,





Leave no doubt in anyone s mind concerning expected
job performance and steps that will be taken if moon-
lighting causes performance to decline. [Ref. 25]
(3) Organizational Property . Organizational
property should only be used in the direct pursuit of legi-
timate, organizational business. Guidelines ~o clarify this
fact are especially important to a firm operating a computer
system oecause ownership of property is frequently not
clear. The individual ieveioper of a piece of software, for
example, may feel ~hat the final product is really per-
sonal property, vice organizational, because he/she perhaps
speni many off-duty hours in completing it. The laws
governing such cases are not always clear, and many cases
are decided in court. To prohibit any misunderstandings,
top management must specify, in terms that cannot be miscon-
strued, that property which comprises organizational assets.
As much as possible, such assets should be marked as organi-
zational property. Also, it is wise that top management
issue a policy that all fruits of all employees' work-
related efforts will be considered company-owned property.
This will put the obligation to prove individual ownership
on the shoulders of those who claim otherwise and will cause
questionable cases to be decided individually.
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(4) Nonuse/Nondisclosure . All computer person-
nel and all employees who possess and use confidential
information and trade secrets or those who may find them-
selves in a position in which conflicts of interest may
arise should be required to read a policy explaining legiti-
mate use and disclosure of the company's valuable informa-
tional assets. The statement should explain specifically
that confidential information can be used only in the con-
text of one's immediate, legitimate job-related activities
.
As a condition of employment, employees should be required
to sign a statement acknowledging their understanding of the
policy and their agreement to comply' with it. [Ref. 12:.p.
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5 Substance Abuse . The use -)i illegal drugs
or the abuse of prescribed drugs and/or alcohol must be
proscribed from the workplace. Also, substance abuse away
from the job that affects on-the-job performance/behavior
must be strictly controlled. While managerial controls
should only focus on those activities that are job-related,
it is important to note that substance abuse has frequently
been found to be a root cause of identified computer systems
abuse. Thus, those individuals who are suspected of abusing
drugs should be considered unreliable and denied access to
sensitive information and processes until their reliability
can be reestablished. In this regard, the employment of
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urinalysis testing is becoming much more widespread and
should be considered as a control and verification tool.
(6) Gambling . Any form of gambling should be
strictly prohibited from occurring on organizational proper-
ty. Also, individuals who are known to be heavily involved
in gambling should be monitored closely and, in some cases,
offered counselling services. If knowledge of indebtedness
also surfaces , they should be removed from having access to
sensitive, valuable assets until the matter is resolved,
c. Employee Assistance Program
The "Employee Assistance Program" is another too
management control that should be employed to help safeguard
sensitive computer systems. Of all the controls discussed
so far. the Employee Assistance Program 'EAP) is potentially
one of the most rewarding, because it will be viewed most
favorably by employees and offers the opportunity to deter
computer abuse and provide more stability, productivity and
higher morale in the workplace, all at the same time. It is
a proactive, pro-worker measure that has been gaining in
popularity in businesses across the country as they attempt
to combat theft and high rates of absenteeism and turnover.
Today, 60% of the Fortune 500 companies employ some form of
internal or external EAP. They are finding it less expen-
sive and more beneficial to get their employees help them to
"lose" them. [Ref. 26]
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Employee Assistance Programs help workers by
providing them with counselling for everything from domestic
problems to drug abuse [Ref. 27] They are especially
effective in EDP organizations, because they offer a place
for troubled workers to seek help for that "unshareable
problem" that often causes them to turn to illegal means for
solutions. The EAP can also counter the extremely high
levels of stress that are inherent in EDP positions, as well
as "burnout," disgruntlement, and substance abuse that can
lead employees into amateur crime,
d. "Whistle 31cwer" Policy
Another cop management control for ensuring the
security of a computer system against internal threats in
the "Whistle 3icwer ?Oiicv. ; ' Whistle blowing can be an out-
standing weapon for top management to use in battling
computer abuse, but it must be employed properly. As Stoner
says, the practice is often discouraged because it " . . .
usually embarrasses management and can be done with impunity
only when the whistle blower is leaving the organization
voluntarily." [Ref. 17 :p. 69]
However, this does not have to be the case. If
top management is proactively employing the security program
and controls already discussed in this paper, instances of
whistle blowing should be rare and can be viewed not as an
embarrassment but as a sign that the security effort is
working properly. As part of their management of the
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ethical environment, if top management were to encourage
whistle blowing and guarantee in words and deed that the
whistle blower would be protected against reprisal, then the
practice would gain in popular acceptance and would be a
viable deterrence against abuse (this assumes, of course,
that top management is viewed as trustworthy in its own
right) .
Deterring abuse in government by changing the
"flavor" of whistle blowing is the motive behind a bill that
is currently pending before the Senate (it has already been
passed by the House of Representatives). The bill is
designed no remove the stigma tnat may oe associated with
whistle blowing and to promote the practice by assuring a
"firm and swift investigation" into allegations and by
providing protection for the whistle blower against possible
reprisal. According to the sponsor of the bill, whistle
blowers are patriots, not troublemakers, and they should be
treated as such. [Ref. 28] By viewing and treating whistle
blowing in the same positive manner prescribed by the
pending legislation, any organization would undoubtedly reap
large benefits not only in the form of detecting crimes but
also in deterring abusive behavior.
e. EDP Auditor
The final top management control that will be
discussed as a tool for securing a sensitive computer system
is the "EDP Auditor." As mentioned earlier, this control
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was identified by the Department of Justice as one that
should be initiated by top management. It " . . . can be one
of the most effective countermeasures a company has in its
total system of safeguards to prevent, detect, and deter
computer [abuse]." [Ref. 12 :p. 222] It is also one of the
singular most important top management controls because it
is implemented with the specific intent of overseeing all
the other security ccumtermeasures. A detailed discussion
of this control would require a book and is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, there are two important aspects of
EDP auditing that are particularly worthy of top managerial
consideration.
First, it is very important for too management
co realize that for ID? auditing to be effective it will
require large doses of the highest level support. This is
true for at least two reasons. These include the fact that
EDP auditing has received a tremendous amount of criticism
in the past and that EDP auditing is extremely time and
resource consuming and will be seen as an especially vibrant
albatross to organizational progress.
According to Krause and MacGahan, EDP auditing
has been heavily criticized by more than a few experts in
the EDP security field. These experts contend that EDP
auditors lack the necessary training and tools to do an ade-
quate job, especially in the area of identifying on-going
computer fraud. This criticism appears not to be without
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merit. [Ref. 12 :p. 222] The significance for top
management is that it must take steps to ensure that the
organization's internal auditing section receives the
training and tools necessary to make it proficient in
auditing computer systems.
Making the EDP auditing function more palatable
to an organization's processes is extremely important to the
auditor's success and represents the second reason that top
level support for the control is mandatory. Computer
systems auditing basically serves two roles in an organiza-
tion: a reacnve role in wmcn it checks or verifies the
efficiency/ effectiveness of other controls, me overall
security program, and in fact of the computer system.
itself; ana, a proactive role in wmcn it plays an active
part in the design and implementation of individual EDP
processes. This latter role is one that will not be favor-
ably viewed by other elements of the business. Everything
mentioned previously about the fettering of productive
effort by security mechanisms seems magnified when one con-
siders EDP auditing.
There is a vast difference between EDP auditing
and traditional auditing—EDP auditing is newer and is
generally considered a much more difficult process. While
traditional auditing has physical records that establish
traceable audit trails, the same is not true of EDP audit-
ing. In many cases, the audit trails of EDP functions
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disappear, literally, at the speed of light as the
electronic pulses change or, perhaps, as the computer is
turned off. In other words, there is inherently no physi-
cal, tangible record, in many cases, that can later be
inspected or audited.
Thus, auditing process functions must be built
right into other operational aspects of the system. This
entails a lot of work and resources and generally compounds
an already complex problem. For example, consider that
adding functions to establish audit trails in an aoplica-
tions program may require hundreds of lines of code in
addirion to the hundreds that the software application
itself may require. Plus, to be most effective at ensuring
that the audit needs are met, the internal auditors should
be actively involved in the design (especially early design)
and should have authority to approve or disapprove many
aspects of the system as it is developed. In such a situa-
tion, it is not hard to imagine the organizational problems
that may exist as the system developers fight with the
auditors over control of the developers' project. Without
active support of top management, the required auditing
features are likely to be dropped or amended, especially as
time constraints begin to take their toll (as they generally
do) .
The second aspect of EDP auditing that is espec-
ially worthy of top managerial consideration is the
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frequency with which the system should be audited. As
Gellerman commented, "Simply increasing the frequency of
audits and spot checks is a deterrent ..." [Ref. 13 :p.
90] However, increasing the frequency of audits is no
simple matter, because audits are very expensive. Top
management must, therefore, determine the most cost-
effective approach to dealing with systems security
problems. It may employ the reactive (yet cheaper) "big
stick" method of resolving problems that are discovered, or
it may employ the more expensive and more proactive tech-
nique of making frequent audits designed to deter crime from
occurring in the first place. [Ref. 13: p. 90]
The final approach taken will likely consist of
some balance between the two methods. Regardless, there are
two ways in which top management can make its auditing
control more effective. First it should not only increase
the frequency of audits to the greatest extent that is eco-
nomically feasible, but it should also schedule the audits
irregularly, making at least half of them unannounced and
setting up some checkups soon after others. Second, if the
audits do detect a trespass, top management should announce
the misconduct and the punitive actions taken. [Ref. 13: p.
90] Recall that the amateur computer criminal fears most
unanticipated detection and public disclosure of his or her
acts. By designing the auditing process so as to most
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The enormous losses suffered by American organizations
through computer abuse can be greatly reduced if a well-
planned and coordinated security effort is employed. Ron
Weber suggests that a common sense approach which breaks the
security process down into seven separate levels of controls
can greatly facilitate the effort. The controls range from
the broad-based and nontechnical measures of the outer
layers of Weber's security "onion" to the very technical and
expensive controls employed at the inner layers. The inner
layers of controls and, hence, the security effort itself.
will only be as effective as bhe outer layers cf controls.
This paper agrees with Weber's thinking and discusses
his outermost layer of controls, those prescribed by top
management of an organization. In essence, it describes
those things that top management must consider and the
things it must do in order to ensure the security of its
sensitive information systems against internal abuse. It,
first, provides a profile of the "enemy" against whom the
computer system must be protected. Although there has been
identified six different types of computer criminals, and
each type, to some extent, poses a threat to organizations'
computer assets, it was found that organizational employees
constitute the greatest danger to computer systems. These
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individuals, called amateur computer criminals, may be some
of the business 1 best performers but, because they have some
"unshareable" problem, they may turn to illegal acts for
what appears to be the most expedient resolution.
The focus then turns to a discussion of how an ethical
business environment is especially important to the security
of computerized assets. Four rationalizations that cause
managers to act unethically were presented. It was shown
how allowing widespread employment of these rationalizations
may be particularly detrimental in computer organizations
because of the expanded size of the workforce in positions
of trust. It was shown how and why top management must lead
the way in overcoming the tendency to rationalize and to act
unethically.
After top management has a firm grasp of the "enemy" and
has instilled the appropriate ethical environment, it must
then take an active role in the formulation of the overall
security program for the organization. Top management's
active participation in this process is vital for several
reasons. Without its support, security control measures
will not be accepted since they inherently stifle productive
effort. Also, since security controls are expensive in both
direct and indirect costs, top management must take an
active role in determining the appropriate level of security
necessary for the individual organization. Finally, the
overall security program serves as the framework within
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which all the other control mechanisms can and will func-
tion. Thus, the computer security effort will only be as
good as the overall security program.
After top management has ensured the establishment of
the appropriate overall security program, it then must
prescribe its own more specific security controls and ensure
that lower management levels of Weber's security "onion" do
likewise. The controls necessary for top management
initiation have, co a great extent:, been provided by the
Department of Justice and the National Bureau of Standards.
They and others presented in Chapter 7 oasicaily serve as an
extension of che frameworK of the overall security program
and may cover any situation that top management sees as
needing special attention in the effort to secure the
organization's information systems against internal abuse.
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